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lucrative international migrant jobs and attractive government employment. In rural Nepal, it 
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21. Introduction 
In low income countries it is common to seek employment in external labor markets in order 
to increase expected individual earnings or diversify household income.1 Although economic 
conditions at home, and prospects elsewhere, are important drivers of labor migration, social 
factors also impact on when and to where workers move. This paper examines how household 
networks in the sending area affect where household members migrate for work, and what 
kind of jobs they are able to find.
It is well documented that individuals searching for jobs in industrial countries rely on 
their personal networks to locate and acquire attractive jobs (Granovetter 1995; McEntarfer 
2003; Ioannides and Loury 2004).2 There is also a rapidly growing literature addressing the 
impact of social networks on labor migration in low or middle income countries (Banerjee 
1983; Stark 1991; Winters et al. 2001; Munshi 2003). This literature is primarily concerned 
with migration chains, i.e. the pulling force of having a network of relatives, friends and 
acquaintances in a particular destination. Few studies have looked into how specific social 
connections may influence labor migration, which is the question we address here.
Our data are from a random sample of rural households from three purposively 
sampled villages in the eastern plains of Nepal. Following Kajisa (2007), we construct a 
network measure by asking households about their acquaintances in high status local 
positions. Apart from data on household networks, information was collected on household 
migration history, assets, social identity (caste or ethnic), education, demography, shocks and 
more. We use this data-set to examine how household characteristics, especially how well 
connected households are, impact on migration outcomes.  
Identifying the causal impact of household networks on labour migration is 
complicated by the fact that observed variation in networks is likely to be endogenously 
related to the migration outcome. Reverse causality is one concern; migration may enable 
households to establish new contacts or prevent maintenance of an existing network at the 
source end. In addition, unobserved household characteristics may influence both household 
connections and the propensity to migrate. We use an instrumental variable technique to attain 
exogenous variation in the network variable, which is then used to estimate the causal impact 
of social connections on migration.  
1 In variants of the Harris-Todaro model, migration is interpreted as an individual decision. In the ‘’new’ economics of 
migration’ synthesized by Stark (1991), the economic interests of households enter the frame. Lucas (1997) provides an 
extensive review of the literature addressing internal migration in developing countries. 
2 The prevalence of network-based labor market entry is higher for low and unskilled jobs and occupations elsewhere in 
South-Asia – see Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2006) evidence from Mumbai, India. 
3In rural Nepal, it would not be surprising if social status, captured by a household's 
caste but also by wealth or education, strongly influenced or perhaps even exclusively 
determined the access to attractive labour market opportunities. This is not the case. Although 
much of the variation in migration can be attributed to wealth, education and social identity, 
household networks have a separate impact on external employment, even after these local 
markers of social status and resources are controlled for. We also find that the caste 
composition of the village neighbourhood affects migration patterns. Our results may be 
summarised as mixed: The bad news is that entry to lucrative labor markets from rural Nepal 
is exclusive, the good news that such exclusion is not only based on traditional markers of 
status such as caste, education or wealth. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the existing literature 
on social networks and migration and develops a theoretical backdrop for our empirical 
analysis. Section 3 presents the data with descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the 
potentially endogenous social network measure and describes our identification strategy. 
Section 5 presents our main results while section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
Social networks do not feature in classical economics models of labor migration. Yet, having 
connections, friends and acquaintances in a particular destination may make it more attractive 
– both financially and socially - for an individual to migrate to the same area. A destination 
network can provide information about job openings, or temporary resources that newcomers 
need (Carrington et al. 1996). Destination employers may, in order to reduce asymmetric 
information and incentive problems, use existing staff to recruit new workers (e.g. Munshi 
2003; Iversen et al. 2009). Destination connections may also make migration less socially 
distressing.
Several studies find evidence that individuals with connections in a potential 
destination are more inclined to migrate to the same area. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2009) study 
the determinants of migration destination in Nepal and find that social proximity is a good 
predictor of destination choice. Banerjee (1983) reports detailed evidence of chain migration 
among migrants in Delhi. Winters et al. (2001) study how historical and current migration 
networks affect migration to the United States from different “ejidos” (villages) in Mexico. 
Over time and within high migration communities, village and family migration networks 
4substitute for each other and cumulative information about migration opportunities becomes a 
local public good.
In an influential study, Munshi (2003) uses a panel data set of migrants from Mexico 
to the US to identify the causes and consequences of having a destination network of 
migrants. He finds that networks improve the outcome (wage) for newcomers and that veteran 
migrants are particularly valuable for new arrivals. This literature also sheds some light on the 
underlying mechanisms; i.e. why prior migration breeds new migration (Massey 1987). 
Munshi suggests that senior migrants act as ‘referees’ for new arrivals, thus alleviating 
asymmetric information problems confronting destination employers.3
While research on migration networks is plentiful, less is known about how social 
networks at the source may affect migration, which is the question we address in this paper. In 
the study closest to ours, Kajisa (2007) measures a personal network as the number of 
influential individuals a person knows, and the person’s proximity to this contact.4 Using data 
from a village in the vicinity of Manila, Kajisa finds personal networks to impact on 
occupational choice. The contacts which affect whether persons end up as employees in small 
firms are different from those that affect the probability of self-employment.5 Network effects 
are also more pronounced for unskilled jobs in small enterprises. Kajisa’s (2007) approach 
adds new insights into how personal networks may facilitate entry into different types of non-
farm employment. 
 We use a similar network measure but focus on a slightly different outcome variable. 
While Kajisa examined how social networks affect local non-farm employment, we study the 
impact of local social networks on migration and specifically the access to government jobs 
and attractive foreign employment.  
In South-Asia, government jobs are highly valued and perceived as ‘secure, well-paid 
and prestigious (Jeffrey et al. 2007)’ and as avenues for collecting bribes that in addition may 
ensure subsidized or free access to health services (ibid.). In our study area, well paid jobs in 
the Persian Gulf or Malaysia are other coveted options.6 Young male migrants to these 
destinations often spend 2-5 years abroad and save up and remit considerable sums of money. 
A registered manpower agency is the usual intermediary between a destination employer, say 
in Qatar, and a prospective migrant. A migrant passing the initial selection hurdle will have to 
3 Iversen et al. (2009) study migration in India and implement an alternative strategy to identify referral effects. 
4 Known as the position generator method in sociology (Lin 2001).
5 Like Munshi (2003), Kajisa (2007) uses an IV approach to control for network endogeneity.
6 For both government and migrant jobs in the Gulf or Malaysia, evidence from elsewhere in the region suggest that such jobs 
may also be associated with sizeable marriage market premia (e.g. Kodoth 2008).
5pay the manpower agency around 100 000 Nepalese Rupees (appr. 1500 USD). According to 
our respondents, this fee is usually funded by loans from friends and neighbors.  
In spite of credit rationing7, there still appears to be an excess supply of prospective 
migrants8. The manpower agencies, by screening applicants and organizing interviews, are 
responsible for and may manipulate selection in a number of ways. Bista (1991) describes 
Nepali society as permeated by patron-client relations, where any favor, including access to a 
lucrative foreign job, needs to be reciprocated9. If correct, we expect labor migrants to the 
Gulf and Malaysia to be better connected than others on average. 
Another conjecture is that for the type of networks we study, household and village 
networks are unlikely to be close substitutes. A key finding in Winters et al. (2001) is that in 
high migration communities, village networks provide services to migrants that in effect 
become local public goods. One such service is valuable information about job openings or 
more general information about the destination area. In our case and in contrast to what 
Winters et al. (2001) find, we expect local connections to provide private services that give 
household members an edge over others in the often fierce competition for coveted 
government and migrant jobs.  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Although Nepal has a long history of labor migration (see e.g. Gurung 2008), large scale labor 
migration from Nepal to the Persian Gulf and Malaysia is a recent phenomenon. Between 
1995 and 2003, remittances more than doubled most of this rise is attributable to transfers 
from migrants in these third countries (not Nepal and India) (CBS 2005). The share of 
remittances from third countries increased from 22.4% in 1995 to 53.3% in 2003 (CBS 2004). 
Migration to Malaysia and the Persian Gulf has continued to rise and has significantly 
reduced rural poverty in Nepal (Lokshin et al. 2007).
Located in the eastern plains (terai), Jhapa is one of the main sending districts. 
Numerous official manpower agencies have offices in the towns of Jhapa and thousands of 
migrants are sent abroad every month. Jhapa is also an important migration destination 
because of the gradual migration and settlement of people from the hills in the plains10. The 
7 For more details on credit rationing in the local credit markets in Nepal see Hatlebakk (2009).
8 An efficiency wage argument may explain why foreign companies may prefer a wage and fee structure that 
leads to excess supply.  
9 It is hard to agree with all of Bista's claims, but his description of group behavior and nepotism, "aphno 
mancche" (our people), is still to the point. 
10 This migration from the hills to the plains and the political and economic consequences for terai and Nepal as 
a whole is described in more detail in Gaige (1975). The plain areas were opened up in the 1950s following an 
6original population of the plains has also, over generations, migrated back and forth between 
Nepal and India. These migration patterns explain the relatively complex caste composition of 
villages in Jhapa, where large communities of hill origin indigenous groups and upper castes 
often co-reside with the indigenous population of the plains.
We selected three rural VDCs of Jhapa district11. One is located near the district 
headquarter of Chandragadhi, another near the main East-West highway and the main border 
crossing to West-Bengal at Khakarbhitta, with the third located close to a remote part of the 
border to Kishanganj district in the north-east corner of Bihar (India). In October-November 
2008 we randomly selected and interviewed 567 households in these three VDCs of Jhapa 
district, 81 households in the smallest (and remote) VDC and 243 in each of the two others 
(which is approximately according to population size). There are 2,579 individuals aged 14 
and above in these households. Their main occupations during the last 12 months are reported 
in Table 1.
Table 1. Present main occupations by location, full adult sample 
   Location:    
Occupation: VDC Jhapa Nepal India Middle-
East
Malaysia Other Sum 
Farmer 895 0 2 0 0 0 0 897 
Self employed 98 39 15 2 0 0 0 154 
Worker:         
Farm 402 1 0 12 0 1 0 416 
Factory 10 18 6 47 29 19 1 130 
Brick industry 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Construction 21 24 5 7 34 3 0 94 
Employee-low:         
Restaurant/hotel 0 0 1 18 8 1 0 28 
Shop 2 3 3 2 4 2 0 16 
Security 1 0 0 7 10 5 0 23 
Employee-high:         
Government 11 26 28 4 0 0 0 69 
Private office 6 9 9 5 9 0 0 38 
Private other 18 11 8 11 20 1 0 69 
Other 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 10 
Student 219 158 24 11 0 0 2 414 
No work 199 7 10 3 0 0 0 219 
Not specified     1   1 
Sum 1886 298 113 131 116 32 3 2579 
Most government jobs are in the security forces as police or military personnel. As Table 1 
shows government employment often implies migration, since a large fraction of household 
members in government jobs work outside Jhapa districts. Among the 567 households 
extensive malaria eradication and forest clearing program. The terai’s share of Nepal’s population increased 
from 35% in 1953 to 52% in 1991 (Gurung 2001). And Jhapa district, in particular, now has a majority of hill 
origin people.  
11 VDC (Village Development Committee) is a local administrative unit that is divided into nine wards. 
7surveyed, 282 individuals had their main occupation outside the country. Excluding migrants 
who do not work, we are left with 266 migrants. The occupational profiles of these migrants 
are presented in Table 2, which gives a snapshot of Table 1. 
Table 2. Present migrant occupations 
 Location: 
Occupation: India Middle-
East
Malaysia Other Sum 
Farmer 0 0 0 0 0 
Self employed 2 0 0 0 2 
Worker:      
Farm 12 0 1 0 13 
Factory 47 29 19 1 96 
Brick industry 0 1 0 0 1 
Construction 7 34 3 0 44 
Employee-low:      
Restaurant/hotel 18 8 1 0 27 
Shop 2 4 2 0 8 
Security 7 10 5 0 22 
Employee-high:      
Government 4 0 0 0 4 
Private office 5 9 0 0 14 
Private other 11 20 1 0 32 
Other 2 0 0 0 2 
Not specified  1   1 
Sum 117 116 32 1 266 
Table 2 shows that the most common migrant activity is factory work in India, followed by 
construction in the Middle-East, and factory work in the Middle-East. In Table 3 we have 
condensed Table 1 to a smaller number of occupational categories that will be used as 
outcomes when we regress occupation on social networks and other explanatory variables 
below.
Table 3. Present main occupation categories 
Occupation category: Full sample Male Female 
Farmer-Nepal 897 383 (28%) 514 (42%) 
Farm-labor-Nepal 403 142 (10%) 261 (21%) 
Worker-Nepal 84 73   (5%) 11   (1%) 
Employee-low-Nepal 18 13   (1%) 5   (0%) 
Self-employed-Nepal 152 93   (7%) 59   (5%) 
Private employee-Nepal 61 49   (4%) 12   (1%) 
Government employee-Nepal 65 59   (4%) 6   (0%) 
Migrant India 117 108  (8% ) 9   (1%) 
Migrant other country 149 137 (10%) 12   (1%) 
Student/No work 633 301 (22%) 332 (27%) 
Sum 2579 1358 (100%) 1221 (100%) 
The table uncovers a startling gender contrast. Labor force participation is about the same, but 
women tend to work in agriculture, while men are overrepresented as non-farm labor, private 
8and government employees, and in particular, among migrants. Only 21 migrants are female 
and most work as domestic servants in the Middle East. With migrants constituting only 2% 
of the female population, in contrast to 18% of the male population, and given the distinct 
occupational profiles, we expect the selection process into migration to be different. Given 
our focus on social networks and migration we will therefore restrict attention to the male 
sub-sample.  
It is of interest to check whether migrants (female migrants included) are clustered in 
particular households. If we include people who work in Nepal, but outside Jhapa district, the 
number of migrants increases to 345. An additional 21 people working within Jhapa report 
themselves to be migrants (two also outside the district as a secondary occupation). This gives 
a total of 366 migrants. Among these, 331 are in their first migrant job, while 35 have had 
other migrant jobs. In addition there are 113 previous migrants, adding up to an overall figure 
of 479 migrants. In Table 4 we report the distribution of these 479 migrants across sample 
households.
 Table 4. Migrants per household 
Type of 
household 
No of households No of migrants 
Zero migrants 242 0 
Single migrant 212 212 
Two migrants 81 162 
Three migrants 24 72 
Four migrants 7 28 
Five migrants 1 5 
Total 567 479 
In the 113 (20%) households with more than one migrant there are 267 migrants in total. For 
each of these households we identified the first migrant. If there was more than one person 
migrating in a given year we chose the oldest as the lead migrant. We have thus defined 154 
followers. Table 5 tabulates the destination of these 154 followers against the destination of 
the first migrant. 
9Table 5. Followers against first migrant location 
  Destination of followers  
First migration: Jhapa Nepal India Middle-East Malaysia 
Jhapa 2 4 3 6 1 
Nepal 1 21 4 8 5 
India 1 5 38 11 5 
Middle-East 2 6 2 21 2 
Malaysia 0 1 0 2 3 
N=154 6 37 47 48 16 
55% of the followers left for the same destination as the lead migrant, while 32% left for a 
more distant location, and only 13% for a destination closer to home. In preliminary 
regressions we included a follower dummy to check whether people are more likely to 
migrate if other household members have already migrated. As expected the coefficient was 
positive and significant. Other coefficients in the regression did not change much, suggesting 
a weak correlation between the follower dummy and other explanatory variables. However, 
the dummy is most likely endogenous since unobservable household characteristics affect the 
probability that each household member will migrate. For this reason we did not include the 
dummy in the regression analyses reported below. Our models are therefore better suited for 
explaining why a household has migrants as opposed to why a particular household member 
migrates. In line with this interpretation we also measure social networks and landholdings at 
the household level. 
Explanatory variables
Before embarking on the multivariate analysis, we report descriptive statistics for the key 
explanatory variables in our analysis; education, landholdings ten years ago, caste/ethnic 
identity, age and social connections. Tables 6-10 split the main occupation categories for the 
male sub-sample reported in Table 3 by these explanatory variables.  
Education and age 
As Table 6 shows, younger men are overrepresented among both migrant groups. Four levels 
of education feature. In the regression analysis we merge some levels if preliminary analysis 
suggests no significant difference, for example if people with completed class five have the 
same probability of finding a migrant job as those with less schooling. There appears to be 
some non-linearities for education. Men who have completed class five are overrepresented 
among India migrants, while men who have completed class nine are overrepresented among 
migrants to third countries. For government jobs, ninth class is the critical level of education, 
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while for private sector the final School Living Certificate (SLC) appears to define a 
threshold.
Table 6. Present main occupation categories (%) by education and age. 
  Education Age 
Occupation category: 
Full 
sample 
SLC Completed 
Class 9 
Completed 
Class 5 
Less
education 
14- 
30
31+
Farmer-Nepal 28 22 26 22 38 13 44 
Farm-labor-Nepal 10 0 1 7 24 6 15 
Worker-Nepal 5 1 2 9 7 8 3 
Employee-low-Nepal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Self-employed-Nepal 7 6 6 7 7 5 9 
Private employee-Nepal 4 9 3 4 0 4 3 
Government employee-Nepal 4 10 8 3 0 3 6 
Migrant India 8 4 7 14 6 13 3 
Migrant other country 10 16 18 11 2 13 7 
Student/No/home work 22 31 28 22 14 35 9 
N 1358 275 225 378 460 689 669 
Land
The relationship between land and occupation (migration) appears to be linear. For the 
descriptive statistics we therefore split the sample into four categories of approximately 
similar number of observations and with cutoffs at 0, 10 and 30 kattha12. For landholdings, 
migration to third countries appears to increase with household land holdings which may 
reflect that land is used as collateral for loans taken up to cover migration costs. 
Table 7. Present main occupation categories (%) by landholdings 
 Landholdings 
Occupation category: 
Landless 0-10 
kattha 
10-30 
kattha 
30+
kattha 
Farmer-Nepal 16 22 36 38 
Farm-labor-Nepal 29 10 2 0 
Worker-Nepal 9 8 4 1 
Employee-low-Nepal 1 2 0 1 
Self-employed-Nepal 8 10 6 4 
Private employee-Nepal 3 3 4 4 
Government employee-Nepal 2 2 7 7 
Migrant India 12 10 7 3 
Migrant other country 3 9 13 15 
Student/No work 18 22 22 27 
N 353 326 302 377 
12 20 kattha = 1 bigha = 0.68 hectare. 
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Ethnic identity 
In a country like Nepal we expect social identity to strongly affect occupational choice. Table 
8 shows that the patterns observed in our sample substantiate these expectations.  
Table 8. Present main occupation categories (%) by ethnic identity 
 Caste/ethnic identity 
Occupation category: 
Hill
B/C
Terai
middle 
Terai
ethnic
Hill
ethnic
Muslim Hill 
Dalit
Terai
Dalit
Farmer-Nepal 36 15 21 31 38 10 0 
Farm-labor-Nepal 3 18 21 4 19 15 0 
Worker-Nepal 1 2 11 3 0 5 0 
Employee-low-Nepal 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Self-employed-Nepal 4 22 9 4 13 10 0 
Private employee-Nepal 4 2 4 4 0 0 50 
Government employee-Nepal 6 2 3 6 0 0 0 
Migrant India 6 13 8 8 25 30 0 
Migrant other country 15 2 5 14 0 5 0 
Student/No work 25 24 18 26 6 25 50 
N 544 55 507 214 16 20 2 
Note: B/C is short for Brahmin/Chettri. Terai and hill refer to the traditional origin of the different groups, with Terai middle
castes representing the traditionally dominant groups of the Indian caste system.  
The terai middle castes are overrepresented among the self- employed and among India 
migrants, while the terai ethnic groups, mainly Rajbansi, are overrepresented among non-farm 
manual workers. Muslims and Dalits are overrepresented among India migrants, while the hill 
origin population is overrepresented among migrants to third countries. It would seem, 
therefore, that caste and ethnicity crucially affect occupational choice, including migration. 
Such identity effects may operate via social networks but could also reflect underlying 
differences in education and wealth. Our multivariate analysis will uncover that our measure 
of social networks has a direct effect separate from caste, while caste identity has an 
independent effect also after wealth and education are controlled for.  
Notice the small sample sizes for the last three categories in table 8. Since Muslims in 
Nepal have low social status, we merge the last three categories into one in the regression 
analysis below. Furthermore, the hill Brahmin/Chettris and the hill ethnic groups, who are all 
relatively recent in-migrants to the study area, display very similar behavioral patterns; hence, 
we merge these two categories. This leaves a total of four social groups for our regression 
analysis keeping the two terai categories apart. In the regression analysis we also include the 
caste composition of each ward (there are nine wards in each VDC) as explanatory 
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variables13. In the regression analysis we prefer to use local terminology and rename the terai 
middle castes as Madhesi and the terai ethnic groups as Adhivasi.
Social networks 
A key question is whether social networks affect the occupational outcome of household 
members. Using a variant of the position generator method, which is popular in the 
sociological literature (e.g. Lin 2001) and applied by Kajisa (2007), we asked respondent 
households about their connections to individuals in positions associated with local status and 
influence (government officials, politicians, managers of NGOs, large local employers (in 
particular tea estates), lawyers, police officers and teachers) in the village and within the 
district three years ago. Some migration events predate this cut-off, but to minimize recall 
problems we decided to focus on contacts three years ago.
We constructed a social network index from the contacts a household reports to have. 
To avoid problems associated with reversed causality, an issue taken up below, the index 
excludes contacts that households are likely to have because of migration, that is, manpower 
agencies, credit institutions and other migrants. This leaves a total of 12 possible contacts. 
The index represents the proportion of these contacts the household knew three years prior to 
our survey. In Table 9 we split the sample at five or more such contacts. Preliminary analysis 
suggests, moreover, that knowing the highest government official of the district, the Chief 
Development Officer (CDO), matters, so we split the sample along this dimension, too. 
13 As the ward-level samples are small, and thus are very imprecise measures of ward-level variables, we use 
population data to classify the caste composition at the ward level. This introduces another bias. In the survey the 
enumerators had the option of asking the respondents when they were in doubt about their caste or ethnic group, 
while the population data is classified (by the same enumerators) based on the names only. From eye-balling the 
data it appears that this bias is much smaller than the sample bias. For most households there is no doubt about 
their ethnicity, if your last name is Rajbansi, then you belong to the Rajbansi ethnic group. 
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Table 9. Present main occupation categories (%) and social networks 
 Network CDO 
Occupation category: 
5-12 
contacts
0-4 
contacts
CDO not 
Farmer-Nepal 32 24 36 27 
Farm-labor-Nepal 7 15 2 12 
Worker-Nepal 4 7 1 6 
Employee-low-Nepal 1 1 1 1 
Self-employed-Nepal 7 7 6 7 
Private employee-Nepal 4 3 4 4 
Government employee-Nepal 7 1 11 3 
Migrant India 5 12 2 9 
Migrant other country 10 11 12 10 
Student/No work 25 19 26 22 
N 739 619 176 1182 
It is evident that households with many contacts are more likely to have members in 
government jobs, while households with fewer contacts are more likely to have labor migrants 
in India or farm workers at home. These patterns may not survive multivariate scrutiny since 
farm workers are also poor and less educated.  
Regression results 
Our main goal is to estimate the causal impact of local connections on migration and 
occupational choice. Before addressing the endogeneity of our network variable, we run a 
simple multinominal regression model with occupation - divided into the categories reported 
in Table 3 - as dependent variable. With no attempt to address endogeneity, the relation 
between social networks and occupational choice must be interpreted as a correlation rather 
than a causal explanation for occupational outcome. 
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Table 10: Multinomial-Logit regression 
Dependent variable: Individual occupations vs. farming 
N = 1338
Farm 
labor 
Labor Empl. low Self-empl. Priv. 
empl. 
Gov. 
empl. 
India migr. Other 
migr. 
No occup. 
Network -3.795*** 
(0.949) 
-2.906*** 
(1.122) 
-0.177 
(1.734) 
-0.073 
(0.739) 
-0.070 
(0.936) 
 1.554* 
(0.799) 
-3.243*** 
(0.954) 
-2.605*** 
(0.774) 
 0.861 
(0.680) 
Age  0.152*** 
(0.052) 
 0.159* 
(0.081) 
 0.169 
(0.150) 
 0.085 
(0.055) 
 0.002 
(0.079) 
 0.257*** 
(0.096) 
 0.216** 
(0.097) 
 0.331*** 
(0.087) 
-0.719*** 
(0.048) 
Age-sq -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Land -0.161*** 
(0.031) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Class
nine+ 
-2.120*** 
(0.747) 
-1.058** 
(0.456) 
-0.216 
(0.709) 
 0.460 
(0.305) 
 1.152*** 
(0.382) 
 1.582*** 
(0.399) 
-0.296 
(0.304) 
 0.519** 
(0.256) 
 1.536*** 
(0.283) 
Hill origin -1.240*** 
(0.303) 
-1.566*** 
(0.370) 
-0.687 
(0.648) 
-1.389*** 
(0.289) 
-0.589 
(0.370) 
-0.325 
(0.389) 
-0.281 
(0.284) 
 0.545* 
(0.295) 
-0.292 
(0.264) 
Musl/Dalit 
share
 1.065 
(1.372) 
-0.716 
(1.823) 
 2.903 
(2.647) 
 1.542 
(1.556) 
-2.478 
(4.359) 
-6.015 
(4.328) 
 2.991** 
(1.445) 
-2.937 
(2.756) 
 1.761 
(1.664) 
Madhesi 
Share 
 2.153 
(2.646) 
 0.366 
(3.285) 
 1.939 
(6.510) 
 6.052** 
(2.666) 
 5.520 
(3.568) 
-5.706 
(4.062) 
 6.661** 
(2.715) 
 1.128 
(2.820) 
 2.189 
(2.604) 
Adhivasi 
Share 
 0.420 
(0.823) 
-1.053 
(0.964) 
 0.854 
(2.001) 
 0.176 
(0.868) 
 0.111 
(1.121) 
 0.370 
(1.001) 
 0.629 
(0.865) 
-0.359 
(0.796) 
 0.935 
(0.755) 
_cons -0.486 
(1.061) 
 0.595 
(1.371) 
-5.301* 
(2.877) 
-1.841* 
(1.104) 
-1.054 
(1.414) 
-6.475*** 
(1.774) 
-0.878 
(1.435) 
-3.856*** 
(1.407) 
10.936*** 
(0.824) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pseudo R2 = 0.3109. 
When we control for household caste, education and landholdings and for the caste 
composition of the ward where a household is resident, migrant households tend to have 
weaker social networks than others. Notice also that households resident in wards 
(neighborhoods) with a high concentration of terai middle castes (Madhesis), ceteris paribus, 
are more likely to be self employed outside agriculture and to be migrants to India. The latter 
also applies to households in Muslim or Dalit wards. For own caste/ethnic identity households 
of hill origin, themselves in-migrants and settlers in the study villages in Jhapa, are more 
likely to have members working in Malaysia or the Persian Gulf. Other control variables have 
the expected signs, households with land do agriculture, while those with education 
(completed class nine or more) are employed in private and government sector or migrate to 
third countries. Except for the expected finding that laborers do not have extensive contact 
with powerful local people, it is noteworthy that migrants have fewer such contacts, while 
government employees have more. 
We next estimate separate probit models for each of the two migration outcomes 
(India and Malaysia and the Persian Gulf) and for government jobs. The results are reported 
below in Tables 12-14. The patterns in the multinomial logit model are preserved in the probit 
models; households who send members to work in India or the Persian Gulf have fewer 
connections than others.
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It is perhaps surprising that households with migrants in Malaysia or the Persian Gulf 
have relatively few connections. If these jobs are lucrative one would expect a queue of 
applicants waiting to get an offer and being from a well connected household would help. 
This argument overlooks that work migration to a far away destination, for example to Qatar, 
is the outcome of a two stage process. First, a household must be willing to send a member to 
a distant destination. Second if the household is willing, that is, if the household perceives this 
as an attractive option, they must be able to find a job in Qatar. How well connected a 
household is may affect both stages in this process, and possibly in opposite directions. Well 
connected households may hesitate to send a household head to Qatar since this makes it 
harder to maintain its connections at home. On the other hand, the probability that households 
aiming to send a member to Qatar, will find an opening is probably improved if the household 
is well connected. A priori we do not know which of these effects that dominates. A causal 
understanding of the results reported above suggests that the first effect dominates. But, as 
noted above, a causal interpretation is as yet premature.  
4 Identifying the causal impact of social networks on occupation 
Instruments
The strength of a household’s social network is not an exogenous variable. Reverse causality 
is one concern; migration may enable a household to establish new contacts or prevent it from 
maintaining old ones. Indeed, the negative association between social networks and migration 
to Malaysia and the Gulf could be explained by the fact that having breadwinners at 
destinations far away from the home village makes it difficult to create and sustain 
connections at the village end. We have made an attempt to minimize this problem by (i) 
constructing a social network index that excludes the connections most likely to have been 
established in the migration process and (ii) by asking households about their connections 
three years ago. Another potential source of endogeneity is that unobserved household 
characteristics may influence capacity and willingness to build connections as well as the 
propensity to send members to the Malaysia and the Persian Gulf.  
To address this problem we need instrumental variables that generate exogenous 
variation in household connections. We use two variables to instrument for social networks. 
The first is an indicator of whether or not the household head was born in the village. 
Households that recently arrived in the village are likely to have a network also in the area 
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where they came from. This suggests that households with a head not born in the village are 
more likely to have a larger set of connections to individuals in influential positions in the 
region, which in turn makes it more likely that they will migrate for work. 
A second potential instrument variable exploits the fact that we have data from three 
villages which differ in remoteness (measured as distance to the district headquarters). 
Distance to the district headquarter is likely to affect households’ possibility to develop 
connections to individuals who hold prominent positions in politics, business and civil 
society. Table 11 indicates that this is indeed the case.  
Table 11. Social contacts 3 years ago, frequency. 
 VDC 1 VDC 2 VDC 3 
Estimated time by 
bicycle to district 
headquarter
60 min 30 min 180 min 
Number of contacts    
1 1 1 5 
2 4 3 3 
3 16 14 21 
4 29 20 29 
5 22 30 21 
6 11 10 13 
7 7 6 4 
8 3 4 1 
9 4 2 0 
10 1 2 4 
11 1 4 0 
12 1 5 0 
N 569 605 184 
The median number of contacts is four in the two more remote VDCs and five in the centrally 
located VDC 2. The mean is 4.3 in the most remote VDC 3, 4.9 in VDC 1 and 5.5 in the 
centrally located VDC 2. Households in the centrally located VDC are thus slightly better 
connected than individuals in the more remote villages.   
A potential problem with using village dummies as instruments is that distance from 
headquarter may not only affect occupational outcomes via network connections. It is 
perceivable that the remoteness of a village has a direct effect on the local labour market and 
hence on people’s propensity to migrate for work. This point may be valid for India 
migration, but is less of a concern when we estimate the impact of connections on migration 
to Malaysia and the Persian Gulf. It is hard to envisage that local variations in the labour 
market should affect the radical and far-reaching decision of whether to migrate for work to 
Qatar. Hence to the extent that distance from the district headquarter affects the fraction of 
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households sending migrants to Qatar, we argue that the effect is likely to come via 
differences in the networks that households have access to.  
We believe that these instruments are also valid for government jobs. We do not 
expect households that moved to the village during the last generation to be more likely to 
have government jobs, except for the fact that they may have a better social network. 
Similarly, we expect household members to take up a government job if they can, 
independently of the location of their village14: A policeman or soldier will have to move 
regularly between districts throughout his working life. Whether the rest of the household 
lives near a particular district headquarter, or not, is not likely to affect the decision to enter 
such a job. 
Results
The results from the IV regressions are reported in Table 12 – 14. In the tables we compare IV 
regressions with a standard – not instrumented – probit model. First we estimate the 
likelihood of migrating to Malaysia and the Persian Gulf. We first used the bornhere dummy 
as a single instrument. When the village dummies turned out to be non-significant these were 
added as instruments. For the IV we estimate the linear version as well, again with and 
without the village dummies. Finally we add ward (sub-village) effects in the linear IV 
regression, first as random and then as fixed effects. 
14 It is our impression that these jobs in the security forces are still rated as among the most attractive among 
young men, despite the ongoing conflict in Nepal (it appears that even Maoist soldiers have a long-term target of 
entering the government forces after the peace process has been completed).
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Table 12. Migration to Malaysia and the Persian Gulf 
N=1338 Probit Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit IV-Reg IV-Reg IV-XT-RE IV-XT-FE 
Network3 -1.385*** -1.246** 4.144* 3.964*** 0.820 0.809* 0.776** 0.647 
 (0.530) (0.520) (2.320) (1.070) (1.118) (0.437) (0.389) (0.598) 
vdc1 -0.072  0.028  -0.001    
 (0.139)  (0.152)  (0.035)    
vdc3 -0.471***  0.034  0.001    
 (0.150)  (0.348)  (0.086)    
Age 0.283*** 0.279*** 0.168 0.176*** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.120) (0.063) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kattha 0.003* 0.003* -0.007* -0.006*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
nineplus 0.196* 0.174 -0.265 -0.250* -0.020 -0.019 -0.017 -0.009 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.266) (0.142) (0.098) (0.043) (0.037) (0.051) 
musl/dalit -0.726* -0.678 -0.888* -0.906* -0.135 -0.134 -0.145** -0.152* 
 (0.422) (0.419) (0.522) (0.486) (0.110) (0.083) (0.069) (0.086) 
madhesi -1.019** -1.072** -0.377 -0.411 -0.040 -0.040 -0.037 -0.031 
 (0.459) (0.470) (0.632) (0.428) (0.085) (0.050) (0.056) (0.065) 
adhivasi -0.617*** -0.612*** -0.213 -0.235 -0.056 -0.056* -0.056** -0.059* 
 (0.220) (0.213) (0.319) (0.177) (0.052) (0.031) (0.025) (0.031) 
musl/dalit% -2.549** -2.289** -1.718 -1.668 -0.146 -0.148 -0.108  
 (1.023) (0.958) (1.210) (1.027) (0.129) (0.120) (0.135) Ward 
Madhesi% -1.605 -0.936 -1.761 -1.804 -0.407 -0.404 -0.414 fixed 
 (1.492) (1.586) (1.196) (1.218) (0.325) (0.270) (0.274) effects 
Adhivasi% -0.122 -0.304 -1.040** -0.999*** -0.242 -0.241*** -0.211**  
 (0.398) (0.350) (0.443) (0.378) (0.208) (0.091) (0.097)  
Constant -4.313*** -4.377*** -3.975*** -4.051*** -0.129 -0.126 -0.129 -0.187 
 (0.553) (0.553) (1.294) (0.763) (0.297) (0.121) (0.111) (0.200) 
Pseudo-R-sq. 0.2206 0.2131       
First stage OLS   network3 network3 network3 network3 network3 network3 
bornhere   -0.044 -0.045# -0.044 -0.044 -0.046*** -0.051*** 
   (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) 
vdc1   -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018  
   (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)  
vdc3   -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.070***  
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016)  
Age   0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kattha   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
nineplus   0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) 
musl/dalit   0.084 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.093*** 0.106*** 
   (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) (0.030) (0.031) 
madhesi   -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.034 
   (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.026) 
adhivasi   0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 
   (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) 
musl/dalit%   0.067 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.047  
   (0.115) (0.111) (0.115) (0.115) (0.067) Ward 
Madhesi%   0.185 0.187 0.185 0.185 0.181 fixed 
   (0.127) (0.130) (0.128) (0.128) (0.123) effects 
Adhivasi%   0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.182***  
   (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.035)  
Constant   0.258*** 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.265*** 0.329*** 
   (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027) (0.023) 
Athrho   -1.059 -1.005***     
   (0.746) (0.343)     
R-squared     0.3020 0.3020   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, p<0.11. FE (and RE) effects are ward effects. 
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In the IV regressions there is a robust positive causal effect of social networks on the 
probability of getting a job in Malaysia or Gulf countries, in support of our main hypothesis. 
Furthermore, we find that village caste composition matters, households resident in a village 
dominated by terai ethnic groups are less likely to have migrant members. This may be 
interpreted as another network effect. In addition, social identity matters since the lower status 
groups of Dalits, Muslims and the terai ethnic groups are less likely to migrate. Furthermore, 
once we control for the endogenous network variable, other resources, such as education and 
land, reduce the probability of migration, which is in contrast to the ordinary probit models 
where the correlations were positive. The change in sign must be driven by positive 
correlations with the social network variable. These negative effects of resource endowments 
are plausible since land and education are likely to improve opportunities at home, with lower 
returns (of education) in the destination where most migrants undertake manual work. 
For migration to India (reported in Table 13) the social network has a negative effect 
in the probit regression with the negative effect amplified in the IV regressions.  
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Table 13. Migration to India 
N=1338 Probit Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit IV-Reg IV-Reg IV-XT-RE IV-XT-FE 
Network3 -1.392*** -1.446*** -4.377# -4.601*** -0.381 -0.489** -0.489# -0.595 
 (0.427) (0.436) (2.732) (1.159) (0.510) (0.240) (0.303) (0.514) 
vdc1 0.228**  0.152  0.026    
 (0.098)  (0.125)  (0.017)    
vdc3 0.308***  0.058  0.013    
 (0.115)  (0.321)  (0.038)    
Age 0.197*** 0.199*** 0.179** 0.177*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.081) (0.062) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kattha -0.009** -0.009** -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nineplus -0.355** -0.361** -0.064 -0.042 -0.030 -0.022 -0.022 -0.010 
 (0.152) (0.149) (0.417) (0.245) (0.047) (0.033) (0.029) (0.043) 
musl/dalit 0.764*** 0.685*** 0.926*** 0.857*** 0.176** 0.171** 0.171*** 0.189** 
 (0.244) (0.236) (0.307) (0.318) (0.085) (0.070) (0.055) (0.074) 
Madhesi -0.238 -0.225 -0.389 -0.414 -0.032 -0.041 -0.041 -0.061 
 (0.284) (0.274) (0.309) (0.285) (0.061) (0.055) (0.046) (0.056) 
Adhivasi -0.191 -0.218 -0.272 -0.292 -0.031 -0.036 -0.036* -0.037 
 (0.203) (0.204) (0.199) (0.196) (0.031) (0.027) (0.020) (0.026) 
musl/dalit% 0.082 0.507* 0.140 0.320 0.094 0.138** 0.138  
 (0.357) (0.281) (0.441) (0.431) (0.070) (0.065) (0.103) Ward 
Madhesi% 3.248*** 2.853* 3.350*** 3.280*** 0.472* 0.472* 0.472** fixed 
 (1.108) (1.460) (1.047) (1.094) (0.262) (0.258) (0.190) effects 
Adhivasi% 0.130 0.346 0.724 0.879** 0.076 0.113* 0.113  
 (0.365) (0.389) (0.732) (0.378) (0.121) (0.068) (0.073)  
Constant -3.121*** -3.028*** -1.938 -1.786* 0.277** 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.407** 
 (0.853) (0.851) (1.898) (1.083) (0.135) (0.070) (0.086) (0.172) 
Pseudo-R-sq. 0.2077 0.2026       
First stage OLS   network3 network3 network3 network3 network3 network3 
Bornhere   -0.044 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044*** -0.051*** 
   (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) 
vdc1   -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017*  
   (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010)  
vdc3   -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069***  
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014)  
Age   0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kattha   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nineplus   0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) 
musl/dalit   0.084 0.082 0.084 0.084 0.084*** 0.106*** 
   (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.030) (0.031) 
Madhesi   -0.027 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.034 
   (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.026) 
Adhivasi   0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
   (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) 
musl/dalit%   0.067 0.072 0.067 0.067 0.067  
   (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.064) Ward 
Madhesi%   0.185 0.183 0.185 0.185 0.185 fixed 
   (0.127) (0.123) (0.128) (0.128) (0.103) effects 
Adhivasi%   0.192*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192***  
   (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.030)  
Constant   0.258*** 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.329*** 
   (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.023) 
Athrho   0.542 0.600**     
   (0.640) (0.302)     
R-squared     0.3020 0.3020   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, # p<0.11. FE (and RE) effects are ward effects.
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The difference between the IV and the ordinary estimates suggests an underlying positive 
correlation between network and the probability of migration. It is possible that migrants learn 
the value of having connections while abroad since contacts are important for finding jobs and 
accommodation in India. However, the causal negative effect appears to dominate even in the 
probit regressions. The causal effect suggests that households with local connections prefer 
alternatives to migration to India. Jobs in India are not well paid and Nepalese citizens often 
feel discriminated against.  
As we may expect, households resident in villages with more Madhesis (people of 
Indian origin) are more likely to send labor migrants to India, and Dalits and Muslims are 
more likely to work in India. However, once we control for the endogenous network variable, 
endowments of education and land cease to matter. In the probit analysis, on the other hand, 
these variables contribute negatively, but these effects are picked up by the network variable 
in the IV regressions.
In sum our findings suggest that India is an inferior labor market which is plausible 
since the wage level in India is not much higher than in Nepal for the low status jobs that most 
people end up in. 
 The final category we consider is government jobs. The jobs we are looking at here 
also involve migration since policemen and soldiers are regularly transferred between duty-
stations within Nepal. Just as for India migration, Table 14 reveals that the IV estimates 
amplifies the probit estimates, but this time both effects are positive. There may be an 
underlying negative reverse causality since people, because of regular job transfers, may not 
be able to maintain their social contacts. In any case, all parameters for the network variable 
are positive, which supports the hypothesis that contacts affect the prospects for getting 
attractive government jobs. Furthermore, and not surprising, our data indicate that Dalits and 
Muslims are excluded from getting government jobs; we also find that people who live in 
Madhesi villages are less likely to get jobs in the security forces, as indicated in the news 
media after the 2007 Madhesi upraising15. Land also has a negative effect indicating that 
joining the security forces is an alternative for households where land holdings are too 
marginal to be split among all brothers. 
15 For more information on the Madhesi ethnic conflict see Hatlebakk (2007). 
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Table 14. Government jobs 
N=1338 Probit Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit IV-Reg IV-Reg IV-XT-RE IV-XT-FE 
network3 1.129*** 1.270*** 4.644 5.555*** 0.336 0.621** 0.585** 0.183 
 (0.370) (0.353) (3.283) (0.964) (0.500) (0.242) (0.257) (0.408) 
vdc1 -0.257*  -0.131  -0.022#    
 (0.152)  (0.204)  (0.014)    
vdc3 -0.514**  -0.171  -0.025    
 (0.208)  (0.466)  (0.034)    
Age 0.186*** 0.182*** 0.145 0.114** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.093) (0.050) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.002** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kattha -0.002* -0.002 -0.008 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Nineplus 0.747*** 0.727*** 0.334 0.141 0.051 0.030 0.033 0.062* 
 (0.162) (0.153) (0.607) (0.231) (0.042) (0.019) (0.024) (0.033) 
Madhesi 0.330 0.327 0.513 0.537 0.030 0.049 0.048 0.017 
 (0.447) (0.459) (0.413) (0.338) (0.041) (0.033) (0.037) (0.044) 
Adhivasi -0.020 -0.004 0.137 0.189 0.002 0.013 0.013 -0.002 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.238) (0.182) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) 
musl/dalit% -1.664 -2.655* -1.850 -2.173* -0.040 -0.091 -0.076  
 (1.752) (1.598) (1.567) (1.261) (0.063) (0.067) (0.077) Ward 
madhesi% -4.075** -3.670** -3.963** -3.521*** -0.329** -0.361*** -0.339** fixed 
 (1.788) (1.548) (1.807) (1.354) (0.157) (0.139) (0.167) effects 
adhivasi% 0.319 0.151 -0.506 -0.798* -0.015 -0.083 -0.072  
 (0.380) (0.438) (0.939) (0.455) (0.107) (0.069) (0.063)  
Constant -5.543*** -5.615*** -5.463*** -4.899*** -0.180 -0.259*** -0.253*** -0.166 
 (0.765) (0.756) (1.505) (0.996) (0.129) (0.066) (0.072) (0.138) 
Pseudo-R-sq. 0.2117 0.2006       
First stage OLS   network3 network3 network3 network3 network3 network3 
Bornhere   -0.041 -0.038 -0.041 -0.041 -0.042*** -0.047*** 
   (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015) 
vdc1   -0.021 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022*  
   (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011)  
vdc3   -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068***  
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015)  
Age   0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Kattha   0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nineplus   0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) 
Madhesi   -0.037 -0.038 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.046* 
   (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026) (0.026) 
Adhivasi   -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
   (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) 
musl/dalit%   0.142* 0.142* 0.142* 0.142* 0.135**  
   (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.060) Ward 
madhesi%   0.179 0.176 0.179 0.179 0.175 fixed 
   (0.126) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) (0.116) effects 
adhivasi%   0.205*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.199***  
   (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.033)  
Constant   0.256*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.261*** 0.335*** 
   (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.023) 
Athrho   -0.668 -0.978**     
   (0.876) (0.386)     
R-squared     0.2978 0.2978   
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, # p<0.11. FE (and RE) effects are ward effects. 
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Are connections a private or a public good?
Winters et al. (2001) find that in high migration communities village networks become local 
public goods. It is interesting to check if this is the case also in our data. We focus on a 
different network than Winters et al. (2001) since they focus on networks of migrants while 
we study connections to powerful persons in the sending area. Apriori one would expect that 
the kind of network we measure first and foremost is a private good. Our results indicate that 
this is indeed the case. In robustness checks we find that the measure of the private 
(household level) social network is significant (in the ordinary probit regressions) also when 
we add the mean of the social network at the VDC level. It appears that this mean measures 
the same as the VDC dummies in the first regression reported in tables 12-14. This suggests 
that the VDC dummies pick up network effects at the VDC level, which supports our 
hypothesis of VDC dummies as good instruments for the social network variable.16 As the 
coefficient for the private social network does not change much when the VDC level network 
is controlled for, we suggest that there is a clear private good element of the local social 
network as a resource that is vital for securing coveted migrant jobs. 
6. Conclusions 
Household social networks improve the odds that Nepali men will get lucrative migrant jobs 
in Malaysia and the Persian Gulf, or attractive government jobs within Nepal. This is so even 
when we control for sub-village caste and ethnic composition and for the household's own 
caste or ethnic identity along with indicators of education and household wealth. It appears 
that distance to the district headquarter matters for the strength of the social network, but we 
do not expect this local variation in distance to have a direct effect on the probability of 
getting external jobs, any effect will be via social connections. We therefore use village 
dummies as instruments for the social network variable. Based on previous work in the region 
(Hatlebakk 2009), we know that social connections are important for getting loans in the 
informal credit market, and access to credit is one of the barriers to foreign migration reported 
by our respondents. Well connected people may also have easier access to government jobs as 
well as the manpower agencies that select candidates for migration to the Gulf and Malaysia. 
16 Note that we cannot add VDC-level variables in the IV-regressions as VDC is used as an instrument for the 
household level social networks. 
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affect access to lucrative international migrant jobs and attractive 
government employment. In rural Nepal, it would not be surprising if 
social status, captured by a household’s caste but also by wealth or
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determined the access to attractive labour market opportunities.  
This is not the case. Although much of the variation in migration can 
be attributed to wealth, education and social identity, household 
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connected households are more likely to get government jobs and 
appear to have favorable access to the manpower agencies and the
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Malaysia.
